The aim of my paper is to highlight that for Peirce the reality of God makes sense of the whole scientific enterprise. The belief in God is a natural product of abduction, of the "rational instinct" or educated guess of the scientist or the layman, and also the abduction of God may be understood as a "proof" of pragmatism. Moreover, I want to suggest that for Peirce scientific activity is a genuine religious enterprise, perhaps even the religious activity par excellence, (...) and that to divorce religion from science is antithetical to both the scientific spirit and the real Peirce. Understanding the real Peirce requires to deal with his religious concerns, which are increasingly recognized as being perhaps as philosophically important as his scientific concerns. Since a key notion in this project is the idea of "il lume naturale" that Peirce borrowed from Galileo, I want also to pay attention to that expression which during years I have been following through Peirce's papers and books. -/- In order to try to explain some of this, my paper is arranged into four brief sections after this already long introduction: 1) God and scientific inquiry; 2) The belief in God as a product of abduction; 3) Galileo and Peirce: Il lume naturale; and by way of conclusion 4) Some remarks on the religious framework of Peirce's approach. (shrink)

A surprising fact in the historiography of the Hispanic philosophy of this century is its almost total opacity towards the American philosophy, in spite of the real affinity between the central questions of American pragmatism and the topics addressed by the most relevant Hispanic thinkers of the century: Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, d'Ors, Vaz Ferreira. In this paper that situation is studied, paying special attention to Charles S. Peirce, his personal connections with the Hispanic world, the reception of his texts (...) in Spanish, and some of the connections that lie almost hidden under the mutual ignorance which divides the two traditions. -/- . (shrink)

Thirty years ago Richard Rorty detected the similarities between Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953) and the philosophical framework of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), the founder of pragmatism. Rorty tried to show that Peirce envisaged and repudiated in advance logical positivism and developed insights and a philosophical mood very close to the analytical philosophers influenced by the later Wittgenstein (Rorty 1961). In spite of that, the majority of scholars have considered both thinkers as totally alien. Some scholars have attributed the pragmatist flavor (...) of the Philosophical Investigations to the influence of Frank P. Ramsey, who awoke Wittgenstein from the dogmatic slumber of the Tractatus. Nevertheless, the real scope of the influence of American pragmatist philosophy in Wittgenstein's later thought is not clearly known. The purpose of my paper is not to describe the common themes between Wittgenstein and Peirce, but the way in which recent scholarship has established some links between both philosophers. -/- . (shrink)

In this short paper I try to present William James’s connection with the Argentinian writer Macedonio Fernández (1874-1952), who was in some sense a mentor of Borges and might be considered the missing link between Borges and James.

The year of the centennial of the Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges is probably the right time to exhume one of the links that this universal writer had with William James. In 1945, Emece, a publisher from Buenos Aires, printed a Spanish translation of William James’s book Pragmatism, with a foreword by Jorge Luis Borges.

In a world of ever growing specialization, the issue of complexity attracts a good amount of attention from cross-disciplinary points of view as this Congress provides evidence. Charles S. Peirce's thought may help us not only to shoulder once again philosophical responsibility which has been largely abdicated by much of 20th century philosophy, but also to tackle some of the most stubborn contemporary problems. The founder of pragmatism identified one century ago most of these problems, and he also mapped out (...) some paths that we could follow to overcome the poverty of contemporary scientistic reductionism. One of these paths is related with the issue of complexity, that lies at the heart of all his conception. -/- Along this line, the aim of my paper is to describe what Peirce can teach about complexity to semioticians coming from very different scientific backgrounds. The lecture will be divided in three sections: 1) a presentation of Peirce, stressing his personal authority as a scientist philosopher, providing also some biographical details; 2) the theory of categories as the heart of complexity according to Peirce and, finally, 3) some consequences of Peirce's notion of complexity in relation with abduction and creativity, semiosis, cross-disciplinarity and communication. -/- . (shrink)

Es realmente un honor y un gusto para mí poder acompañar a Fernando Zalamea y a sus numerosos discípulos en la celebración de sus 60 años. En mi breve texto, deseo dar noticia de su colaboración con nuestro Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos y del importantísimo catálogo que constituye la Bibliografía Peirceana Hispánica (1883- 2000) por él preparada y que publicamos en un volumen conjunto en el año 2006 [Nubiola & Zalamea 2006].

In Spain, Peirce's thought has generally remained almost unknown throughout the syllabi of the various Licentiate programs offered. The only exceptions are the degrees of Linguistic, Communication Studies, and Philosophy, in which Peirce's semiotics is normally only alluded to or cursorily presented. Much the same could be said of Latin America. There is evidence, however, that this situation is beginning to change: translations into Spanish are now appearing, particularly in the web, which make a notable amount of Peirce’s vast production (...) accessible to the Spanish-speaking readership. Interest in Peirce's work is clearly growing in the Hispanic world, probably due to the general resurgence of pragmatism, and to the gradual approximation of Hispanic philosophers to American academic philosophy. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) made relevant contributions to deductive logic, but he was primarily interested in the logic of science, and more especially in what he called 'abduction' (as opposed to deduction and induction), which is the process whereby hypotheses are generated in order to explain the surprising facts. Indeed, Peirce considered abduction to be at the heart not only of scientific research, but of all ordinary human activities. Nevertheless, in spite of Peirce's work and writings in the field of (...) methodology of research, scarce attention has been paid to the logic of discovery over the last hundred years, despite an impressive development not only of scientific research but also of logic. -/- Having this in mind, the exposition is divided into five parts: 1) a brief presentation of Peirce, focusing on his work as a professional scientist; 2) an exposition of the classification of inferences by the young Peirce: deduction, induction and hypothesis; 3) a sketch of the notion of abduction in the mature Peirce; 4) an exposition of the logic of surprise; and finally, by way of conclusion, 5) a discussion of this peculiar ability of guessing understood as a rational instinct. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to describe the situation of mutual ignorance between American and Hispanic philosophical traditions, paying special attention to the figure and thought of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914). In order to do this, first of all I will justify the usage of the expression "Hispanic Philosophy", highlighting its heuristic and practical value. Secondly, I will discuss some of Peirce's comments in relation with the Hispanic world. And finally, by way of conclusion, I (...) will mention some of the connections that lie nearly hidden under the cloak of ignorance which divides the two traditions. (shrink)

In a world of ever growing specialization, the idea of a unity of science is commonly discarded, but cooperative work involving cross-disciplinary points of view is encouraged. The aim of this paper is to show with some textual support that Charles S. Peirce not only identified this paradoxical situation a century ago, but he also mapped out some paths for reaching a successful solution. A particular attention is paid to Peirce's classification of the sciences and to his conception of science (...) as a collective and cooperative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to discover the truth. -/- . (shrink)

Our aim in this article, after providing the general framework of the reception of William James in Spain, is to trace the reception of The Varieties of Religious Experience through Unamuno’s reading of this book.

The epistemic status of Natural Selection has intrigued to biologists and philosophers since the very beginning of the theory to our present times. One prominent contemporary example is Elliott Sober, who claims that Natural Selection, and some other theories in biology, and maybe in economics, are peculiar in including explanatory models/conditionals that are a priori in a sense in which explanatory models/conditionals in Classical Mechanics and most other standard theories are not. In this paper, by analyzing what we take to (...) be the four possible interpretations of Sober’s claim, we argue that, terminological preferences aside, the possible senses in which explanatory models in Natural Selection can qualify, or include elements that can qualify, as a priori, also apply to Classical Mechanics and other standard, highly unified theories. (shrink)

A standing question in consciousness science is whether consciousness arises gradually or in a sudden way. This empirical question is connected to a metaphysical one, concerning the kind of property that consciousness is, i.e., graded or categorical. Recently, Lee (2022) suggested that settling this question requires deciding which theory of consciousness is true. Applying an insight from Wiese (2020), this chapter pursues a way of approximating answers by examining properties that are necessary for consciousness, which consciousness must have regardless of (...) which theory turns out true in the end. One such property is attention. This chapter suggests that attention is connected to consciousness in such a way that a graded view of the former brings support for a graded view of the latter. To this effect, evidence is discussed that degrees of attention are reflected in several acknowledged dimensions of consciousness. The upshot of this view is that the transition from unconscious information processing to conscious experience is gradual and is a function of degree of attention. (shrink)

The relationship between William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) has recently been the subject of intense scholarly research. We know for instance that the later Wittgenstein's reflections on the philosophy of psychology found in James a major source of inspiration. Not surprisingly therefore, the pragmatist nature of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is increasingly acknowledged, in spite of Wittgenstein’s adamant refusal of being labeled a “pragmatist”. In this brief paper I merely want to piece together some of the available (...) evidence of Wittgenstein’s high regard for William James, not only for his thoughts, but even more so for his character. (shrink)

This entry is a presentation of C. S. Peirce and of his connections with A. N. Whitehead. Also Whitehead's connections with Peirce are explored.

The American novelist Walker Percy (1916-90) considered himself a "thief of Peirce", because he found in the views of C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, an alternative approach to prevailing reductionist theories in order to understand what we human beings are and what the peculiar nature of our linguistic activity is. -/- This paper describes, quoting widely from Percy, how abduction is the spontaneous activity of our reason by which we couple meanings and experience in our linguistic expressions. This coupling (...) of personal creativity and cultural tradition makes it possible to bridge the gaps between persons and cultures. (shrink)

In this paper the relations between the almost unknown Spanish mathematician Ventura Reyes Prósper (1863-1922) with Charles S. Peirce and Christine Ladd-Franklin are described. Two brief papers from Reyes Prósper published in El Progreso Matemático 12 (20 December 1891), pp. 297-300, and 18 (15 June 1892) pp. 170-173 on Ladd-Franklin, and on Peirce and Mitchell, respectively, are translated for first time into English and included at the end of the paper.

This is the introduction to the special issue of the Spanish journal Ágora-Papeles de Filosofía (31/2, 2012) devoted to new Ibero-American contributions to metatheoretical structuralism.

The 'critical turn' in tourism studies is defined as a research perspective that explores social transfor- mation in and through tourism by facing the negative impact of strategic-instrumental rationality on this activity. This work explores the features of discourse ethics that may normatively support tourism transformation, a gap that has not been thoroughly discussed in tourism research. For this purpose, the study combines the use of critical and ethical theory with an analysis of discourse ethics in tourism literature to demonstrate (...) that the use of Habermasian discourse ethics needs to be complemented with the Apelian approach. Through these steps the work reveals the theoretical bases of discourse ethics to discuss whether understandings between stakeholders guided by strategic-instrumental rationality can be reached not only in the political sphere —Habermas—, but also in the ethical field —Apel. (shrink)

This paper has two separate aims, with obvious links between them. First, to present Charles S. Peirce and the pragmatist movement in a historical framework which stresses the close connections of pragmatism with the mainstream of philosophy; second, to deal with a particular controversial issue, that of the supposed logicistic orientation of Peirce's work.

A distinction is introduced between itemized and non-itemized plural predication. It is argued that a full-fledged system of plural logic is not necessary in order to account for the validity of inferences concerning itemized collective predication. Instead, it is shown how this type of inferences can be adequately dealt with in a first-order logic system, after small modifications on the standard treatment. The proposed system, unlike plural logic, has the advantage of preserving completeness. And as a result, inferences such as (...) ‘Dick and Tony emptied the bottle, hence Tony and Dick emptied the bottle’ are shown to be first-order. (shrink)

One usually makes assertions by means of uttering indicative sentences like “It is raining”. However, not every utterance of an indicative sentence is an assertion. For example, in uttering “I will be back tomorrow”, one might be making a promise. What is to make an assertion? C.S. Peirce held the view that “to assert a proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth” (CP 5.543). In this thesis, I interpret Peirce’s view of assertion and I evaluate Peirce’s reasons for (...) holding it. I begin by reconstructing and assessing Peirce’s case for such view as it appears in (EP 2.140, 1903), (EP 2.312-313, 1904), and (CP 5.546, 1908). Then, I continue by elaborating on three aspects of Peirce’s view of assertion, namely, assertion as an act involving a certain kind of responsibility, the proposition as what is asserted, and responsibility for truth as a responsibility to give reasons. With respect to these three aspects, I argue for the following claims: (1) Peirce construed the responsibility involved in asserting as a moral responsibility; (2) Peirce held that propositions are types; and (3) Peirce was committed to a dialogical interpretation of “responsibility to give reasons”. Finally, I end by presenting two objections to Peirce’s view of assertion and its corresponding replies. I conclude that Peirce’s account of assertion is a valuable contribution to the philosophical debate on assertion. (shrink)

This paper is based on a criterion recently proposed by Richard Fumerton for demarcating philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I suggest to extend it to a demarcation criterion between philosophy and science in general, and put it in the context of the historical changes of boundaries between the philosophical and the scientifi c fi eld. I point to a number of philosophical claims and approaches that have been made utterly obsolete by the advancement of science, and conjecture that a (...) similar thing may happen in the future with today’s philosophy of mind: under the supposition that cognitive science manages to progress very successfully in a certain direction, our concepts for mental states could change, and the type of philosophical interest we put in them, thus reshaping thewhole debate on the subject. (shrink)

In a recent opinion paper, it was argued that individuals with multiple retractions or a record of academic misconduct should not serve as editors, including as editors-in-chief, on the editorial boards of scholarly or academic journals. As a first step towards appreciating how such a policy could be applied in practice, the presence of 30 individuals listed on the Retraction Watch Leaderboard on editorial boards was screened. Six cases are highlighted to gain an appreciation of the potential reputational risks that (...) journals and publishers might incur by including individuals with a tainted academic record on editorial boards. Given the reputational, legal and other risks associated with this type of assessment and decision, more formal positioning and guidance are needed by global ethics policy-related bodies such as COPE, the ICMJE, and the CSE, even more so in journals that claim to follow these organizations’ ethical guidelines. (shrink)

La denotación de los nombres propios es un problema tradicional de la Filosofía que aún es discutido en nuestros días. La tesis de este ensayo es que, lejos de ser una problemática superada, el debate sigue muy vivo y se siguen generando constantes aportaciones que contribuyen a enriquecer esta discusión en la actualidad. El objetivo que aquí se propone es mostrar que los argumentos tradicionales están motivando nuevas propuestas que mantienen la actualidad del debate, como las de Robert Stalnaker y (...) Jason Stanley. Para este propósito, se emplea el método hermenéutico-crítico sobre la bibliografía consultada. Concluimos reivindicando la actualidad del tema en Filosofía. (shrink)

People who experience love often experience break-ups as well. However, philosophers of love have paid little attention to the phenomenon. Here, I address that gap by looking at the grieving process which follows unchosen relationship terminations. I ask which one is the loss that, if it were to be recovered, would stop grief or make it unwarranted. Is it the beloved, the reciprocation of love, the relationship, or all of it? By answering this question I not only provide with an (...) insight on the nature of break-ups, but also make a specific claim about the nature of love. I argue that the object that is universally lost in all break-ups is a person with certain intrinsic qualities, who is in a relationship characterised by certain shared activities and recognized as romantic. That means that, at least in romantic terminations, the beloved and the relationship are not independent objects of grief. So, plausibly, they may not independent objects of value in love. Hence, those who state otherwise should face up to this objection coming from the study of break-ups. (shrink)

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...) explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to show how the language is conceived in the encyclical Fides et ratio, especially taking into account its relationship with truth. It is also attempted to present an analitical study of the text concerning language: the different references to it and the consideration of the modern sciences of language; how truth is linked to language and signification, and how human language though linguistic communication can surely renew and enhance the rational expressin of Christian (...) faith. (shrink)

Los filósofos han construido la filosofía a partir de la reflexión sobre el hombre y su realidad circundante más inmediata. Al menos en la época presente, la filosofía en cuanto reflexión sobre el ser, debe partir —en mi opinión— de la consideración atenta de los artefactos que constituyen casi en su totalidad —con excepción de los seres humanos y de algunos pocos animales y plantas que hay en nuestro ámbito habitual— el mundo efectivo en el que nos encontramos: la pluma (...) con la que escribo, el papel, la mesa, la silla, los libros, los cigarrillos, la habitación y todo el edificio en el que estoy, incluso las palabras que estoy garabateando, la lámpara que me ilumina, quizás también la luz eléctrica que despide la bombilla: ¿no son todas esas cosas artefactos? Me permito aventurar de antemano que esas cosas, los artefactos, son los elementos relevantes para el filósofo de nuestros días: la noción de artefacto —que tiene una vetusta tradición— puede proporcionar un modelo racional explicativo válido para afrontar viejas y nuevas cuestiones de la metafísica y del lenguaje. -/- . (shrink)

It is technically possible to clone a human being. The result of the procedure would be a human being in its own right. Given the current level of cloning technology concerning other animals there is every reason to believe that early human clones will have shorter-than-average life-spans, and will be unusually prone to disease. In addition, they would be unusually at risk of genetic defects, though they would still, probably, have lives worth living. But with experimentation and experience, seriously unequal (...) prospects between cloned and noncloned people should erode. We shall ignore arguments about cloning that focus on the potential for harm to the fetus or resultant human being, where harm is understood solely in terms of physical and mental health. Unless the resultant people would generally have lives worth living there is no positive case for cloning, or any other form of reproduction, for that matter. If the resultant beings will generally have lives worth living there is a prima facie case for allowing cloning. We imagine the case in which the resultant beings will have lives well worth living. (shrink)

In my paper I make a summary assessment of the connection between Eugeni Crexells and Eugeni d'Ors and that of both of them with pragmatism. I organize it in three sections: 1. First, the philosophical formation of Crexells and its relation with D'Ors; 2. Eugeni d'Ors and pragmatism, and 3. Joan Crexells and pragmatism.

What I argue in this article is neither new nor very original, but important, in my opinion, for the organization of the political space and for the intellectual work of each person. I try to defend epistemological pluralism, that is, that problems and things have facets, different faces, and that there are different ways to think about them. At the same time I want to reject relativist skepticism and vulgar pragmatism, with which this view is frequently associated. The rejection of (...) scientific foundationalism or of ethical fundamentalism does not necessarily lead to relativist skepticism. With the help of the best pragmatist tradition, it is possible to try a compromise that supports fallibilism without resorting to skepticism and cooperative pluralism. A pluralist pragmatism holds —with Hilary Putnam— that there is nothing such as a privileged vision of man and the world offered by the Science. Sciences, on the contrary, are cooperative and communicative human activities through which we humans really progress, not without having doubts or making mistakes, in our understanding of the world and ourselves. It is argued that non-relativist pluralism is not only one of the best results of contemporary scientific research but also is an indispensable requirement to achieve a truly democratic social organization. -/- My paper is divided in three sections. Firstly, pragmatism is briefly discussed; secondly, the connection between relativism, "vulgar pragmatism" and the so-called "neopragmatism" is described; and finally, I will offer an explanation of why the pluralism, which is the legacy of the best pragmatism, is not relativist. (shrink)

Connections between W. James and L. Wittgenstein have been widely highlighted in recent scholarship: his mature reflections on the philosophy of psychology found in James a major source of inspiration. This paper gives reason of Wittgenstein's refusal to being labelled "pragmatist" and stresses -against Schulte- the influential role of James in the development of Wittgenstein's thought.

Connections between J.L.Vives and C.S. Peirce are shown. Not only is reflec-tion on language and meaning central in both thinkers, but Peirce also knew Vives' thought especially through W. Hamilton and the Scottish common sense school. Peirce credited Vives with being a forerunner of the use of dia-grams in logic, and both share a critical view of late medieval nominalistic logicians and a social and hierarchical conception of knowledge.

La atención relativamente escasa que los estudiosos del filósofo y científico norteamericano Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) han prestado a lo largo de los años a las dimensiones religiosas de su pensamiento siempre me ha parecido cuando menos sorprendente. Desde mis primeras lecturas de Peirce me impresionó profundamente esa desatención que tanto contrastaba con la ubicuidad de las referencias religiosas en los escritos de Peirce, especialmente en sus años de madurez. En mis encuentros con reconocidos estudiosos peirceanos solía preguntarles acerca de (...) Dios y la religión en Peirce, y la respuesta que recibí casi siempre fue que efectivamente había una gran cantidad de cuestiones religiosas en su obra, pero que no estaban interesados en ellas. Por otra parte, me sorprendió gratamente que el fallecido novelista Walker Percy se considerara a sí mismo en su correspondencia con Ken Ketner como “un ladrón de Peirce”, aspirando a “usar a CSP como uno de los pilares de la apologética cristiana”. Me pareció que el novelista converso al catolicismo estaba en algún sentido mucho más cercano al Peirce real que aquellos estudiosos a los que les había preguntado acerca de Dios y la religión en Peirce. -/- El objetivo de este artículo es subrayar el hecho de que para Peirce la creencia en Dios no es sólo un producto natural de la abducción o "instinto racional", de las conjeturas educadas del científico o del hombre corriente, sino que también la creencia en Dios y el desarrollo científico están interrelacionados. No sólo la creencia en Dios es capaz de cambiar la conducta del creyente, sino que de acuerdo con Peirce la realidad de Dios dota de sentido a toda la empresa científica. Esto puede sonar un poco extraño a los oídos positivistas contemporáneos, pero para comprender realmente a Peirce es preciso estudiar sus preocupaciones religiosas, que de forma creciente se consideran quizá tan importantes filosóficamente como sus preocupaciones científicas6. Más aún, en algún sentido quiero sugerir que para Peirce la actividad científica es una empresa genuinamente religiosa, quizá incluso la actividad religiosa por excelencia, y que separar religión y ciencia es contrario tanto al espíritu científico como al Peirce real. (shrink)

In this paper we develop a view about the disorientation attached to the process of falling out of love and explain its prudential and moral value. We start with a brief background on theories of love and situate our argument within the views concerned with the lovers’ identities. Namely, love changes who we are. In the context of our paper, we explain this common tenet in the philosophy of love as a change in the lovers’ self-concepts through a process of (...) mutual shaping. This, however, is potentially dangerous for people involved in what we call ‘subsuming relationships’, who give up too much autonomy in the process of mutual shaping. We then move on to show how, through the relation between love and the self-concept, we can explain why the process of falling out of love with someone is so disorientating: when one is falling out of love, one loses an important point of reference for self-understanding. While this disorientating process is typically taken to be harmful to the person experiencing it, we will explain how it can also have moral and prudential value. By re-evaluating who we were in the relationship and who we are now, we can escape from oppressive practices in subsuming relationships. We finish by arguing that this gives us reason to be wary of seeking to re-orient ourselves -or others- too quickly after falling out of love. (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

The relations between the Scottish School of Common Sense and the Catalan philosophy of Martí d'Eixalà and Llorens i Barba are well known. But the links between that Catalan tradition and the thought of Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954) have not been studied. The study of the texts from d'Ors and of the cultural context of his philosophical development gives strong support to the suggestion that the germinal role that Scottish philosophy had during the XIX century in the so-called School of Barcelona (...) was taken over in the first decades of the XX century by a special blend of pragmatism and vitalism coming from Paris. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es dar noticia de la recepción del pragmatismo en la obra y el pensamiento de Eugenio d’Ors, reuniendo algunos resultados de nuestros trabajos preceden- tes2. Dedicamos una primera parte a describir el encuentro de Eugenio d’Ors con el pragmatismo. En segundo lugar describimos su conexión con William James a quien llegó a conocer en París. En tercer lugar, damos cuenta de en qué consiste la denominada “superación del pragmatismo” por parte de Eugenio d’Ors y, por (...) último, señalamos las afinidades más relevantes de su pensamiento con algunas de las intuiciones más originales del pragmatismo de Charles S. Peirce. (shrink)